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CHAPTER 3 
Trusts & Estates 
JAMES R. DeGIACOMO* 
AND 
JUDITH K. WYMAN 
§3.1. Charitable Trusts-Construction-Conditions on Bequests 
to a Religious Society. During the Survey year the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided an important case affecting the administration of charita-
ble trusts established for the benefit of religious societies. In First Bank 
and Trust Company of Hampden County v. Attorney General, 1 the 
Court determined that the merger of the First Unitarian Society of 
Chicopee (Chicopee Society) with the Third Congregational Society in 
Springfield (Springfield Society) did not result in the termination of 
certain charitable trusts which were established for the benefit of the 
Chicopee Society. 
The merger of the Chicopee Society with the Springfield Society was 
allowed by special statute.2 Section 2 of the special statute provided that 
[u]pon the completion of the merger ... the [Chicopee Society j 
shall no longer continue as a separate society and the [Springfield 
Society in Springfield] under its existing corporate powers may 
carry on the activities heretofore carried on by said [Chicopee 
Society] as part of the activities of said [Springfield Society in 
Springfield], and all persons who were members of said [Chicopee 
Society] shall become members of said [Springfield Society in 
Springfield]. 3 
The statute also provided for the transfer of all property of the Chicopee 
Society, which included bequests, devises and gifts, to the Springfield 
* James R. DeGiacomo is a partner in the law firm of Roche, Carens & DeGiacomo, 
Boston. 
** Judith K. Wyman is a partner in the law firm of Roche, Carens & DeGiacomo, 
Boston. 
§3.1. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 164, 359 N.E.2d 938. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 325. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 165, 359 N.E.2d at 939. 
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Society which was to be vested with all of the powers, rights and privi-
leges possessed by the Chicopee Society with respect to such property. 4 
Persons claiming under the residuary clauses in the wills which cre-
ated the charitable trusts in question brought suit in probate court, 
contending that the trusts failed as a result of the merger. The plaintiffs 
relied upon terms of the trusts which provided for the trusts' termina-
tion upon the cessation of specified religious activity by the Chicopee 
Society. Thus, under the terms of one of the trusts it was provided that 
the income was "to be applied to the support of Unitarian preaching in 
Chicopee by the Unitarian Society of said City. If said Society shall fail 
to continuously support such preaching substantially, the principal to 
fall into the residue clause of this will. "t The probate court judge found 
that following the merger religious services were conducted in Spring-
field. He therefore concluded that the failure to conduct services in the 
city limits of Chicopee was fatal to the continuation of the trust. 6 Reject-
ing this finding, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the probate 
court's construction of the terms of the bequest was "unduly narrow and 
restrictive and in conflict with our general rule that charitable trusts 
should be construed liberally. "7 The Court went on to state that 
[t]he dominant intent of the testator was to provide for the perpe-
tuation of Unitarian beliefs among the residents of Chicopee. . . . 
It is not necessary to require the physical presence of a preacher 
in a pulpit in Chicopee every Sunday morning to achieve this 
purpose. The bequest was not conditioned on the continued sepa-
rate existence of the Chicopee Society. 8 
The Court further pointed out that the merger was brought about be-
cause of the substantial decrease in membership in the Chicopee Society 
and toinsure that Unitarian services would continue to be available to 
the people of Chicopee.• The Court therefore stated that "[w]hile the 
Chicopee Society no longer exists as a separate entity, its religious activ-
ities are carried on by the Springfield Society, and we conclude that the 
Springfield Society has continuously and substantially supported Uni-
tarian preaching within the meaning of the bequest. " 10 
The three other trusts litigated in First Bank and Trust Company 
were subject to the following condition: "[l]f the said Unitarian Society 
ceases to hold religious services as a Unitarian Church Organization, the 
' Acts of 1972, c. 325. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 167, 359 N.E.2d at 940. 
I fd. 
7 ld. 
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bequest given under this clause and those given in paragraphs ten and 
eleven of this will, shall all of them revert to [the testator's] estate and 
become a part of the residue of [the testator's] estate .... " 11 The 
probate judge found that these trusts failed as a result of the merger 
because the Chicopee Society had ceased to hold services as a Unitarian 
church organization within the meaning of the condition. 12 In reversing 
this finding, the Supreme Judicial Court pointed out that the Spring-
field Society was holding services as a Unitarian church organization 
and as a result of the merger, all members of the Chicopee Society 
automatically became members of the Springfield Society .13 The evi-
dence before the probate court judge also indicated that the Chicopee 
Society was in severe financial difficulty due to the decline in its mem-
bership and that the merger was proposed in order to assure that Uni-
tarian services would continue to be available to the residents of Chico-
pee.•• Therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that although 
the Chicopee Society ceased to exist as a separate organization upon 
merger, it continued to exist as a part of the merged Springfield Society 
and to provide religious services for Chicopee residents. 15 
In its liberal construction of this charitable trust, the Court seems to 
have ignored the intent of the bequests which was to further Unitarian 
activity within Chicopee. Thus, the message is clear that if a testator 
wishes to create a charitable trust in favor of a religious organization and 
wishes to condition the trust on the organization's maintaining activity 
within a certain community, that limitation must be expressed unambi-
guously. 
§3.2. Charitable Trusts-Construction-Limitations of Finan-
cial Assistance-"Young Men." In Ebitz v. Pioneer National Bank 1 
the Supreme Judicial Court over Justice Quirico's dissent construed the 
words "young men" as used in a charitable trust providing for financial 
assistance to law students as including "young women." .Under the 
terms of his will, the testator provided for the establishment of "The 
Richard W. and Florence B. Irwin Scholarship Fund."2 The net income 
from the fund was to be used "to aid and assist worthy and ambitious 
young men to acquire a legal education . . . . "3 Only residents of the 
city of Northampton were eligible for consideration for assistance from 
11 ld. at 169, 359 N.E.2d at 941. 
12 ld. 
1s Id. at 170, 359 N.E.2d at 941. 
1' ld. at 168, 359 N.E.2d at 940. 
11 ld. at 171, 359 N.E.2d at 942. 
§3.2. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 543, 361 N.E.2d 225 . 
• ld. 
s ld. at 544 n.4, 361 N.E.2d at 225-26 n.4. 
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the fund.' However, in the trust the testator expressed his desire to assist 
as many students as possible.5 The trust also stated: 
Richard W. Irwin was devoted to Northampton, to which he came 
as a young man, and where he lived and made for himself an 
enviable reputation as citizen, lawyer and Judge. He was ably 
assisted by his wife, Florence Bangs Irwin. Judge Irwin frequently 
expressed an interest in the educational program of the Knights 
Templar, of which organization he was a member for many years. 
It is suggested to my Trustee that it acquaint itself with the educa-
tional work of this organization and use its program as a guide in 
the carrying out of the trust imposed on it under this portion of my 
will.• 
The plaintiffs, female law students, made applications to the trustee 
for assistance from the fund. 7 The trustee rejected their applications on 
the ground that only male applicants were eligible for consideration. 
Rejecting the trustee's construction of the trust, the probate judge held 
that the testator did not intend to exclude female residents of Nor-
thampton from eligibility for fund assistance. He therefore construed 
the term "young men" as used by the testator to include "young 
women. "8 After review was sought in the Appeals Court, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, on its own initiative, ordered direct appellate review. 8 
The majority opinion of the court sustained the finding of the probate 
judge.10 The Court stated: 
[t]he term "young men" is unambiguous unless, in the context 
of the entire instrument, an element of ambiguity is introduced. 
When such an element of ambiguity appears, we look at the entire 
trust instrument and to the general scheme it reveals in order to 
clarify the intended significance of the troublesome term .11 
The Court found that a reading of the entire trust rendered the term 
"young men" ambiguous. The Court pointed out that the testator sug-
gested that his trustee use the educational program of the Knights Tem-
plar as a guide for carrying out the purposes of the trust. 12 The Court 
noted, however, that the Knights Templar maintained a trust fund from 
which it extended loans to students pursuing a higher education, with-
4 ld. 
' ld. at 545, 361 N.E.2d at 226. 
' ld. at 544 n.4, 361 N.E.2d at 225-26 n.4. 
7 Id. at 545, 361 N .E.2d at 226 . 
• ld. 
1 ld. at 543. 
11 Id. at 546, 361 N.E.2d at 226. 
II Jd. 
12 ld. at 547, 361 N.E.2d at 227. See text at note 6 supra. 
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out regard to sex. 13 Thus, construing the Irwin fund in light of the poli-
cies of the Knights Templar, the Court concluded that the testator did 
not intend to restrict eligibility for grants under the Irwin fund on the 
basis of sex. In addition, the Court found that the intent of the testator 
to assist "as many students as possible" 14 and his use of sex-neutral 
terms throughout the trust implied that the trustee was not to be re-
stricted to awarding financial assistance to male law students. The 
Court also noted that the testator dedicated the fund not only to Judge 
Irwin, but also to Florence Irwin, his wife. 15 This again was an indication 
to the Court that the testator did not intend to limit financial assistance 
only to male students. 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Quirico found no ambiguity in the 
use of the term "young men." In his view, even though such a sex-based 
restriction was currently in disfavor, it was not unlawful. 16 Justice Quir-
ico also expressed his concern as to the possible effects of the Court's 
decision upon existing instruments. In particular, he reasoned that if 
"young men" meant "young women" in the case, it would be exceed-
ingly difficult to distinguish other instruments where similar language 
was used. 17 Justice Quirico concluded by stating that "[ijf the court's 
decision is 'the product of human impulses', I share those impulses, but 
.I subordinate them to [the testator's] right to impose the restriction 
limiting the beneficiaries of his trust fund to 'young men'."'K 
Whether or not one agrees with the result advocated by Justice Quir-
ico, it appears that he was correct in recognizing the broader implica-
tions of Ebitz for other charitable trusts manifesting a facial intent to 
impose sex-based restrictions. In particular, Ebitz indicates that, the 
lawfulness of such sex restrictions notwithstanding, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court will resolve every conceivable ambiguity against such restric-
tions. 
§3.3. Charitable Trusts: "General Charitable Intent." Under the 
terms of the trust involved in Fulton v. Trustees of Boston College, 1 the 
trustee was directed "to hold all the remaining assets ... adding in-
come not expended ... to principal-until January 15, 2000 A.D., 
noon, at which time my said Trustee shall turn over said fund and assets 
to the Trustees of Boston College . . . for the purpose of erection . . . 
13 /d. 
•• Id. 
" Id. See text at notes 2 & 6 supra. 
11 /d. at 552, 361 N.E.2d at 229 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
17 /d. at 553, 361 N.E.2d at 229 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
11 /d. at 554, 361 N.E.2d at 229 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
§3.3. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 725, 361 N.E.2d 1297. 
5
DeGiacomo and Wyman: Chapter 3: Trusts & Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
38 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §3.3 
of a building for administrative or educational purposes . . "2 The 
executors filed a federal estate tax return and took a charitable deduc-
tion under section 2055 of the Internal Revenue Code.3 The Internal 
Revenue Service disallowed the deduction and assessed a tax deficiency 
on the basis that it was possible that the bequest to Boston College could 
fail and pass by intestacy. 4 
The plaintiff appealed this determination to the tax court, contending 
that, as a matter of state law, the bequest would not fail because the 
bequest indicated a general charitable intent,' or, in the alternative, 
because the doctrine of cy pres would apply. The Tax Court recognized 
that if the bequest would not fail as a matter of state law, the Internal 
Revenue Service would accept the trust as a qualified charitable be-
quest.• Accordingly, the Tax Court stayed the proceedings pending a 
determination by the Supreme Judicial Court as to the existence of 
general charitable intent and as to whether the doctrine of cy pres could 
be applied to the trust. 7 
The Court held "that the charitable trust will not fail in the event 
circumstances in the year 2000 preclude compliance with its specific 
provisions, "8 because of the general charitable intent of the bequest. In 
particular, the Court concluded that an examination of the trust in its 
entirety "exhibits a general charitable intent, not only to benefit Boston 
College but other similar charities. The existence of such an intent is 
shown by the testator's provision of six other bequests to Catholic chari-
ties, all, like Boston College, within the Catholic Archdiocese of Bos-
ton."' The Court further reasoned that a general charitable intent was 
also indicated by the failure of the testator to provide for gifts over in 
the event the trust should fail. 11 Having found that the general charita-
ble nature of the trust would save the trust even if compliance with its 
provisions would be impossible in the year 2000, the Court found the 
plaintiff's request that it apply the doctrine of cy pres premature. 11 
1 I d. at 726, 361 N .E.2d at 1298. 
I I.R.C. § 2055. 
4 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 726, 361 N.E.2d at 1298. 
1 H a general charitable intent is found, the court will attempt to honor it by liberal 
construction. H this cannot be done in strict accordance to the terms of the trust, a court 
will attempt to fulfill the donor's general intent to the extent possible. See id., citing 
Rogers v. Attorney General, 347 M888. 126, 131, 196 N.E.2d 856, 860 (1964). 
• This determination is one of state law, and, therefore, a decision of the highest state 
court is binding on the federal tax authorities. See, e.g., Putnam v. Putnam, 366 M888. 
261, 262 n.2, 316 N.E.2d 729, 731 n.2 (1974). 
1 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 726, 361 N.E.2d at 1298. 
• ld. at 728, 361 N.E.2d at 1299. 
'ld. at 727, 361 N.E.2d at 1298. 
II fd. 
11 ld. at 728, 361 N.E.2d at 1299. 
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§3.4. Charitable Trusts-Filling Vacant Trusteeships-Role of 
the Attomey General. The probate court has jurisdiction to fill a va-
cancy in a trusteeship where no provision is made in the instrument for 
a successor trustee.• In Frank Wilson, Trustee2 the two active trustees 
of seven charitable trusts petitioned the court to fill the vacancy of a 
third co-trustee. The Attorney General, however, opposed the appoint-
ment of the individual proposed by the petitioners and sought the ap-
pointment as co-trustee of a nominee of his own choice.3 The probate 
judge found that both the nominees were qualified, but entered a decree 
appointing the nominee of the two active trustees. 4 
The Attorney General appealed from the probate court's decree, con-
tending that he was entitled to the appointment of his own nominee. In 
so contending, the Attorney General placed substantial reliance on 
Lovejoy, Petitioner.' Lovejoy held that where there is a vacancy in the 
trusteeship of a private trust and the beneficiaries agree upon a qualified 
successor trustee, "the Probate Court, in the absence of facts strongly 
indicative of the necessity of a different appointment, should follow the 
wishes of the parties principally concerned."• The Attorney General 
argued that in a charitable trust he represents all of the beneficiaries, 
who are the members of the public as a whole.7 The Court acknowledged 
this argument but found the present case distinguishable from Lovejoy, 
on which the Attorney General relied.• Noting that Lovejoy involved a 
private trust, the Supreme Judicial Court stated that "[i]n the case of 
a private trust, the compatibility of the trustee with the individual 
beneficiaries, his sensitivity to their needs and wishes, is highly impor-
tant. . . . The same kind of intimacy is not needed, and perhaps is not 
wanted, as between the trustee of a charitable trust and the Attorney 
General."' The Court thus concluded that in the case of a charitable 
trust providing for plural trustees the factor of paramount importance 
is not cooperation between the trustees and the Attorney General, but 
instead cooperation among the co-trustees in the administration of the 
trust. 
The Court also rejected the argument of the Attorney General that he 
was entitled to have his nominee confirmed by the court since he has 
§3.4. 1 See 2A ScO'M', TRusTS § 108.2 (3d ed. 1976). 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 692, 361 N.E.2d 1281. 
1 Id. at 693, 361 N.E.2d at 1283. The Attorney General is charged with representing the 
interest of the public in the administration of charitable trusts. See Davenport v. Attorney 
General, 361 Mass. 372, 379, 280 N.E.2d 193, 198 (1972); G.L. c. 12, § 8. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 693, 361 N.E.2d at 1283. 
• 352 Ma88. 660, 227 N.E.2d 497 (1967). 
• I d. at 665, 227 N .E.2d at 500. 
7 1977 Ma88. Adv. Sh. at 695, 361 N.E.2d at 1283 . 
• ld. 
• ld. at 696, 361 N.E.2d at 1284. 
7
DeGiacomo and Wyman: Chapter 3: Trusts & Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 2012
40 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §3.5 
the responsibility for the administration of charitable trusts. The Court 
held instead that this responsibility does not displace the court's discre-
tion under section 5 of chapter 203 of the General Laws with respect to 
charitable trusts. 10 The Court based its view on the belief that "the 
relation between the Attorney General and the court under [section] 5 
should be a cooperative one in which the Attorney General offers his 
views to the court and the court gives them the special consideration due 
to his official expertness and impartiality."11 
§3.5. Probate-Final Decrees-Basis for Vacation-Petitions in 
the Nature of Bills of Review. Prior to the adoption of the Massachu-
setts Rules of Civil Procedure, after the entry of a final decree the 
probate court could not revoke or vacate the decree except upon a peti-
tion in the nature of a bill of review. 1 During the Survey year the Appeals 
Court decided two cases which arose prior to the adoption of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure and concerned the circumstances under which a peti-
tion to revoke or vacate a decree would be considered in the nature of a 
bill of review. 
In Olsson v. Waite2 the probate court disallowed for probate a signed 
copy of a will, finding that the original of the will had been destroyed 
by the testator with the intention of revoking it. The same court subse-
quently vacated its decree. The bases for this action by the probate 
judge were the claim by the proponent of the will of his inability to 
attend the second day of trial and his offer of additional evidence on the 
issues being litigated. 3 The probate judge also found that the propo-
nent's attorney did not request a continuance which he would have 
granted. 4 On appeal by the contestant the Appeals Court held that 
"[t]he instant case does not fall within the purview of a bill of review, 
... nor within any of the exceptions to the general rule. Rather, it falls 
within a settled application of the general rule, that 'the decree cannot 
be vacated . . . because the case of the petitioner was not properly 
presented."'1 The original decree disallowing the will was therefore af-
firmed, and the decree revoking the original decree was reversed.• 
•• Id. at 697, 361 N.E.2d at 1284. 
II /d. 
§3.5. 1 Kennedy v. Simmons, 308 MaBB. 431, 32 N.E.2d 215 (1941). Under Mass. R.C.P. 
60(b) the court may now relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment 
order or proceeding for, inter alia, mistake, inadvertence, excusable negligence, newly 
discovered evidence, or fraud. 
2 1977 MaBB. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 144, 359 N.E.2d 656. 
3 /d. at 144, 359 N.E.2d at 657. 
• Id. at 145, 359 N.E.2d at 657. 
5 /d. at 146, 359 N.E.2d at 657, quoting Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 MaBB. 228, 229, 165 
N.E. 89, 90 (1929). 
• Id. at 148, 359 N.E.2d at 658. 
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In Naughton v. The First National Bank of Boston, 7 on the other 
hand, the Appeals Court held that a petition to vacate a decree was of 
the nature of a bill of review and that the decree was properly vacated.K 
Naughton concerned a decree allowing the accounts of trustees under a 
will. The decedent died in 1961, and by the residuary clause of his will 
created a trust for the benefit of an aunt.' The trust provided, in relevant 
part, that the aunt should receive one hundred dollars "a month for life, 
with full power in the Trustees, in the event of an emergency, to use a 
portion of the principal which, in their discretion, [s]hould be neces-
sary for her comfort and support, consistent with her standard of living 
for the past five years." 10 Upon the death of the decedent's aunt the 
executor of her estate requested payment from the trustees for the ex-
penses of her last illness; the trustees refused to make such payment. A 
demurrer was sustained in a contract action brought by the executor, 
and judgment entered for the trustees. 11 Subsequently the executor con-
tested in probate court the allowance of the trustees' accounts. 12 How-
ever, the probate court, on March 18, 1970, rendered a decree allowing 
the accounts as filed. The executor appealed and requested a report of 
material facts. 13 Because the trial judge had resigned without making a 
report of material facts, no such report of material facts was ever filed. 
In August 1972 the executor filed a petition in probate court to vacate 
the decree allowing the accounts. In accordance with this petition the 
trial judge vacated the decree and made findings of fact. 14 The trustees 
appealed, contending that the executor's claim to reimbursement had 
no merit. 15 Rejecting the trustees' contentions, the Appeals Court sus-
tained the trial court's action. The court noted that a decree may be 
revoked "for any reason that would warrant a bill of review in equity,"•• 
and reasoned that the resignation of the trial judge prior to filing the 
report of material facts would be one such circumstance. 17 The court also 
agreed that the facts of the case were worthy of judicial inquiry, since, 
although a court will not ordinarily review a trustee's exercise of discre-
tion, an exercise of trustee discretion is nevertheless reviewable to deter-
7 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1106, 356 N.E.2d 1224. 
• Id. at 1110-11, 356 N.E.2d at 1227. 
• Id. at 1106-07, 356 N.E.2d at 1225. 
11 Id. at 1106 n.1, 356 N.E.2d at 1225 n.l. 
11 Id. at 1107, 356 N.E.2d at 1225. 
12 ld . 
.. ld. 
14 ld. at 1108, 356 N.E.2d at 1225. 
1s I d., 356 N .E. 2d at 1226. 
" Id. at 1110, 356 N.E.2d at 1227, quoting Agricultural Nat'! Bank v. Bernard, 338 
Mass. 54, 57, 153 N.E.2d 761, 763 (1958). 
" Id., citing Brooks v. National Shawmut Bank, 323 Mass. 677, 681,84 N.E.2d 318,321 
(1949). 
9
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mine whether it is "plainly wrong."18 In Naughton, the trustee's refusal 
to pay any of the expenses of the beneficiary's last illness was thus 
reviewable to determine if it was "plainly wrong" or an abuse of the 
trustee's discretion. 18 
In light of the adoption of Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b), Olsson and Naughton will soon be of primarily historical interest. 
The language of Rule 60(b) would allow for a broader power to vacate 
than did the "bill of review" standard of Olsson and Naughton. It ap-
pears that under the new rule, the decrees in both cases would have been 
vacated.20 
§3.6. Trusts-Suits for Trustee's Alleged Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty-Res Judicata. In Dwight v. Dwight1 the testator bequeathed his 
entire interest in Holyoke Transcript, Inc. (Holyoke), a newspaper, to 
his second wife. The will also established a trust for the benefit of Henry 
Dwight, the testator's son by his first marriage. Moreover, the will pro-
vided that upon the death of his second wife, one-sixth of the testator's 
interest in Holyoke would be distributed to the trust. 2 During her life-
time the second Mrs. Dwight, together with her son Willian Dwight, 
transferred most of the assets of the newspaper from Holyoke to two new 
corporations, leaving as the only assets of Holyoke the plant and presses 
formerly owned by the newspaper. 3 Thus, after the second Mrs. Dwight's 
death in 1957, 132 shares of Holyoke were delivered to the trustee for 
the benefit of Henry Dwight, but these shares represented only a frac-
tion of the assets formerly owned by that corporation. In October 1957 
these 132 shares were sold by the trustee to Holyoke and another corpo-
ration, both subject to the control of William Dwight. 4 The plaintiffs in 
Dwight, Henry Dwight's sons and sole heirs, sought recision of the sale• 
alleging that their father and the trustee were induced to make the sale 
by false representations made by William Dwight. In the alternative, 
the plaintiffs sought payment of damages by William Dwight. 8 The 
probate court, however, dismissed the action, holding that a prior action 
presented a res judicata bar. 
In the prior action a guardian ad litem appointed to represent the 
•• ld. at 1109, 356 N.E.2d at 1226, citing Woodberry v. Bunker, 359 Mass. 239, 242-43, 
268 N.E.2d 841, 844 (1971). 
" See id. at 1108-09, 356 N.E.2d at 1226, and cases cited therein. 
" See note 1 supra. 
§3.6. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2708, 357 N.E.2d 772. 
2 The facts upon which the case was based are set forth irt O'Brien v. Dwight, 363 Mass. 
256, 294 N.E.2d 363 (1973). 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2710, 357 N.E.2d at 774. 
• ld. at 2709, 357 N.E.2d at 773 . 
• ld . 
• ld. 
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interests of Henry Dwight's grandchildren objected to the allowance of 
the trustee's first account. By that first account, the trustee received a 
mere one-sixth of the diminished assets of Holyoke.7 Alleging that Mrs. 
Dwight, in transferring assets to the new corporations breached her 
fiduciary duty to the trusts, the guardian sought an order requiring the 
defendants to tum over a one-sixth interest in the corporations to which 
the newspaper business had been transferred. 8 The court agreed that 
Mrs. Dwight had breached her fiduciary duty and granted the order 
sought by the guardian.• Subsequently the executors of Mrs. Dwight's 
estate complied with the court's order and transferred the shares in 
question. 
The guardian ad litem in the prior action also attacked the sale by 
the trustee of the 132 shares of Holyoke Transcript, Inc. to that corpora-
tion, alleging that the trustee was negligent in relY.ing upon the ap-
praisal made by three appraisers appointed by the probate court, and 
in selling the shares for the appraised price of $760 per share. 111 The 
probate court in O'Brien v. Dwight11 held that the trustee would be 
accountable only if he acted in bad faith or without exercising reasona-
ble skill or judgment, and that in the present case it could not be said 
the trustee had so acted. 
In Dwight v. Dwight, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the pro-
bate court's dismissal of the action and held that its decision in 0 'Brien 
v. Dwight upholding the sale was res judicata as to the present action.13 
More particularly, the Court relied on the doctrine of merger, which 
mandates that "[w]hen a valid and final personal judgment is rendered 
in favor of the plaintiff ... [t]he plaintiff may not thereafter maintain 
an action on the original claim or any part thereof .... " 14 While the 
plaintiffs were not parties to the former action, the Court held that their 
interests were identical with the interests of their children, who were 
represented by the guardian ad litem, and that the transaction was so 
closely connected to the "'series of connected transactions' out of which 
the prior claim arose"16 that it was in effect litigated in the prior action, 
and any damages suffered could have been claimed in the prior case. 
Moreover, the Court held that the merger doctrine applied despite the 
fact that the action in 0 'Brien was for the alleged negligence of the 
7 363 Mass. at 271, 294 N.E.2d at 371. 
• Id. at 267, 294 N.E.2d at 371. 
1 /d. at 270, 294 N.E.2d at 371. 
11 /d. at 274, 294 N.E.2d at 374. 
11 363 Mass. 256, 294 N.E.2d 363 (1973). 
11 /d. at 296, 294 N .E.2d at 386. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at" 2715, 357 N.E.2d at 776. 
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or JUDGMENTS f 47(a) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2714, 357 N.E.2d at 775. 
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trustee, while the present action was for William Dwight's alleged false 
representations in inducing the sale. Since there was no evidence that 
the failure to assert the present claim in the prior case was due to fraud 
or misrepresentation, the claim was barred. 16 
§3.7. Trusts-Powers of Appointment-Prospective Adoption of 
Rule 358(e) of the Restatement of Property. The power of a donee of 
a special power of appointment to appoint the principal to a new trust 
has received judicial consideration in numerous contexts, and the cases 
have engendered considerable doubt as to when such an appointment 
to a new trust is valid.l In Loring v. Karri-Davies, 2 decided during the 
Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court has dispelled some of that 
doubt and indicated that for instruments executed after the date of its 
opinion3 the rule applied would be that stated in section 358(e) of the 
Restatement of Property. 
In Loring, a trust under the will of the decedent, a Boston attorney, 
provided that the sum of $250,000 should be held for the benefit of the 
decedent's daughter "to pay the income quarterly or oftener to ... [the 
donee] for life, and upon her death to pay over and convey the principal 
of the trust property to and among her issue as she may by will appoint, 
and in default of appointment to her issue then surviving, in equal 
shares by right of representation. " 4 In addition, an inter vivos trust 
provided that the trustees thereof were . . . 
[t]o pay the whole of the net income of the Trust Estate in semi-
annual payments to the said [donee] during her life ... ; and upon 
the decease of said [donee], upon the further trust to pay over the 
said Trust Estate ... discharged and free from trust, to and among 
her children or issue as she may by her last will and testament 
appoint, and in default of appointment in equal shares to her 
children and to the issue of any deceased child by right of represen-
tation .... 5 
The donee died on August 22, 1974leaving a will executed December 
8, 1969 in which she attempted to exercise the powers of appointment 
11 I d. at 2715, 357 N .E.2d at 776. 
§3.7. 1 See Hooper v. Hooper, 203 Mass. 50, 59, 89 N.E. 161, 162 (1909) (donee's exer-
cise of power by appointing property in trust held invalid). Cf. North Adams Nat'! Bank 
v. Comm'r of Corps. & Taxation, 268 Mass. 42, 45, 167 N.E. 294, 295 (1929) (exercise valid 
where language of the special power was broader and gave larger power than in Hooper); 
Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 241, 126 N.E. 461, 463 (1920) (exercise valid, distin-
guishing Hooper as a case where the donee had mere power of selection amongst children). 
' 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2607, 357 N.E.2d 11. 
3 That date was November 16, 1976. 
' 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2609, 357 N.E.2d at 12-13. 
' ld., 357 N.E.2d at 12. 
12
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by creating two new trusts for the benefit of her children or issue of her 
deceased children.8 Each trust was to be terminable upon the happening 
of a certain event, and the property was to be distributed to the issue 
of the donee. The question before the Court was whether the donee had 
validly exercised the special powers of appointment granted under the 
above-quoted clauses.7 The Court, citing Hooper v. Hooper stated that 
the issue was to be resolved by a determination of the intention of the 
donor of the power. The Loring Court reasoned that Hooper presented 
an almost identical situation; that the Court there held that in failing 
to mention further trusts the donor by implication intended an absolute 
termination of the trust; and that therefore the donee could not validly 
exercise the power by creating new trusts. The Court thus decided that 
in the present case the rule set forth in Hooper should be followed, since 
" ... it is fair to suppose that the [donor] in using the language which 
appears in the [powers of appointment] 'had in·mind the interpretation 
of similar words and clauses in cases decided in this Commonwealth.' " 111 
While following Massachusetts precedent in the instant case in recog-
nition of the parties' presumed reliance thereon, the Court announced 
its intention to apply section 358(e) of the Restatement of Property to 
special powers of appointment in trusts executed after the date of 
Loring. 11 Section 358(e) sets forth a rule more liberal than that of the 
Hooper case. It provides that "[i]f, but only if, the donor does not 
manifest a contrary intent, the donee of a special power can effectively 
... (e) appoint interests to trustees for the benefit of objects." 12 In 
support of its adoption of the Restatement rule, the Court noted that 
the trend of recent decisions is to follow the rule of the Restatement, and 
that "it would be helpful if the law of this Commonwealth corresponded 
with the provision of the Restatement .... " 13 Consequently, in such 
instruments executed after the date of Loring, unless the donor of the 
power provides otherwise, the donee of a special power will be able to 
appoint the property on further trusts. 
Justice Braucher, while signifying his agreement with the Court's 
decision to adopt the rule of the Restatement in future cases, dissented, 
stating that in his opinion there was a significant difference between the 
• Id. at 2610, 357 N.E.2d at 13. 
7 ld. 
• 203 Mass. 50, 89 N.E. 161 (1909). 
• Id. at 59, 89 N.E. at 162. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2611, 357 N.E.2d at 13, quoting Proctor v. Lacy, 263 Mass. 1, 
8, 160 N.E. 441, 443 (1928). 
11 The plaintiff had urged the application of section 358(e) to the instant case. ld. at 
2612, 357 N.E.2d at 14. 
12 REsTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 358(e) (1940). 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2616, 357 N.E.2d at 16. 
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language used by the donors in Hooper and in the present case. Justice 
Braucher reasoned that the less restrictive language in the present case 
warranted a finding that the power was validly exercised. 14 
§3.8. Rights of Holders of Notes Against a Guarantor's Es-
tate-Statute of Limitations-Matured and Unmatured Claims. 
Cantor v. Newton, 1 decided by the Appeals Court during the Survey 
year, involved twenty-three separate actions to recover balances due on 
certain notes made by two entities, a partnership and a corporation. The 
notes were of four classes: demand notes, notes payable "on demand, 
with 30 days notice," long term subordinated notes, and so-called 
"senior notes."2 All of the notes except the senior notes had been guaran-
teed by Goodman. 3 Goodman died in 1967, at which time both the 
partnership and the corporation were solvent. 4 Goodman's widow was 
appointed executrix of Goodman's estate, and, after the expiration of a 
year, distributed the residue of the estate to herself and a bank as co-
trustees of two trusts created by Goodman's will. The widow was the 
beneficiary of the two trusts for her life.• 
In 1970 the partnership and corporation began to default on the notes, 
and various holders of the notes filed petitions with the probate court 
under the then-existing provisions of section 13 of chapter 197 of the 
General Laws, • to require the executrix to retain assets sufficient to pay 
•• ld. at 2618-20, 357 N.E.2d at 16-17 (Braucher, J., diBSenting). 
§3.8. 1 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1214, 358 N.E.2d 247. 
1 ld. at 1215, 358 N.E.2d at 249. 
3 ld. The latter were senior to the long term notes. 
•Id. 
1 I d. at 1216, 358 N .E.2d at 249. 
1 ld. at 1217, 358 N.E.2d a:t 249. At the time this case was brought G.L. c. 197, § 13 
provided: 
A creditor of the deceased, whose right of action does not accrue within one year 
after the giving of the administration bond, or within such further time as may be 
allowed by any extension granted under section nine, or in the case of an adminis-
trator de bon;s non, within the period allowed by section seventeen, may present 
his claim to the probate court at any time before the estate is fully administered; 
and if, upon examination thereof, the court finds that such claim is or may become 
justly due from the estate, it shall order the executor or administrator to retain in 
his hands sufficient 888ets to satisfy the same. But if a person interested in the 
estate offers to give bond to the alleged creditor with sufficient surety or sureties 
for the payment of his claim if it is proved to be due, the court may order such bond 
to be taken, instead of requiring assets to be retained as aforesaid. If because of 
pilrtial distribution already made, or because of inability to sell the real estate of 
the deceased, the executor or administrator is unable to retain sufficient assets to 
satisfy the claim in full as finally established, the creditor may enforce his claim 
for the balance under section twenty-nine, within one year from the final settlement 
of said estate or from the time when the amount of said balance is finally deter-
mined. 
14
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the claims. After the executrix filed accounts with the probate court 
showing that she no longer possessed any such assets, the court dis-
missed the creditors' petitions. 7 
The holders of the notes filed a bill in equity in the superior court in 
order to reach the assets of the trust and of its beneficiaries, pursuant 
to sections 28 and 29 of chapter 197 of the General Laws. 8 Those sections 
provide that a creditor whose right of action accrues after the settlement 
of an estate or whose claim could not legally be presented to the probate 
court, may reach the assets ofthe trust and beneficiaries. The superior 
court entered judgment for the holders of the notes, whereupon the 
widow and trustee appealed.' The appellants' primary contention was 
that the superior court should have held the creditors' claims barred by 
the applicable statutes of limitations. 
With regard to the demand notes the Appeals Court upheld the appel-
lants' contention and held that claims upon such demand notes were 
barred by the statute of limitations applicable to decedents' estates, 
since such an obligation is due as soon as the note is delivered. 10 Simi-
larly the notes payable "on demand, with thirty days notice" could have 
been sued upon for an eleven month period (excluding the 30 day notice 
period) after the executrix was appointed, and the court therefore held 
that claims brought after that period were barred.11 
By Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 18 this section was amended to permit creditors to bring suits 
under G.L. c. 197, § 29within nine months from the date offmalsettlementofthe estate. 
7 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1217, 358 N.E.2d at 250. 
• G.L. c. 197, §§ 28 & 29 provide as follows: 
§ 28. After the settlement of an estate by an executor or administrator, and after 
the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of actions against him by 
the creditors of the deceased, the heirs, next of kin, devisees and legatees of the 
deceased shall be liable in the manner provided in the following sections for all 
debts for which actions could not have been brought against the executor or admin-
istrator, and for which provision is not made in the preceding sections. 
§ 29. A creditor whose right of action accrues after the expiration of said time of 
limitation, and whose claim could not legally be presented to the probate court, or 
whose claim, if presented, has not been allowed, may, by action commenced within 
one year next after the time when such right of action accrues, recover such claim 
against the heirs and next of kin of the deceased or against the devisees and legatees 
under his will, each of whom shall be liable to the creditor to an amount not 
exceeding the value of the real or personal property which he has received from the 
estate of the deceased. But if by the will of the deceased any part of his estate or 
any one or more of the devisees or legatees is made exclusively liable for the debt 
in exoneration of the residue of the estate or of other devisees or legatees, such 
provisions of the will shall be complied with, and the persons and estate so ex-
empted shall be liable for only so much of the debt as cannot be recovered from 
those who are fmt chargeable therewith. 
• 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 1223, 358 N.E.2d at 251. 
11 Id. at 1219-20, 1223, 1227, 358 N.E.2d at 251-53, 255. 
11 Id. at 1221-22, 358 N.E.2d at 251-52. 
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In the case of the subordinated notes, however, the court found that 
the requirements of section 28 of chapter 197 were met. 12 Thus, the court 
affirmed the portion of the decree determining that Goodman's widow 
and the trustee were liable for their payment, subject to the requirement 
that the widow was not liable for any amount in excess of what she had 
received from the trust. 13 In determining that the requirements of sec-
tion 28 had been met, the court reasoned that the statute of limitations 
did not bar the note-holders' suits because none of the subordinated 
notes came due within the period permitted for actions against an exec-
utorY 
Having found the executrix not liable on the two classes of "demand 
notes" and liable on the subordinated notes, the court turned to the 
question of the executrix' liability on the senior notes. The court held 
that Goodman's estate was not liable on the senior notes because they 
were executed after Goodman's death. Accordingly, the court reversed 
the part of the superior court judgment which determined that the hold-
ers of the subordinated notes were liable to the holders of the senior 
notes. In so holding, the court noted that to hold otherwise would have 
prevented the holders of the subordinated notes from ever realizing on 
the guaranty .15 This result would have followed because under the terms 
of the superior court decree, the holders of the subordinated notes were 
ordered to pay to the holders of the senior notes all amounts received 
by them from Goodman's trustees. 
§3.9. Wills-Illegitimate Children as Omitted Heirs-Equal 
Protection. Hanson v. Markham 1 involved a constitutional challenge to 
section 20 of chapter 191. That section provides that "[ijf a testator 
omits to provide in his will for any of his children, ... [such omitted 
children] shall take the same share of his estate which they would have 
taken if he had died intestate, ... unless it appears that the omission 
was intentional .... "The section has been construed as applying only 
to legitimate children. 2 The plaintiff, the illegitimate daughter of a dece-
dent, contended that the statute as construed deprived her of equal 
protection by not entitling her to the share she would have been entitled 
to had she been a legitimate child.3 In so contending she relied on a line 
of Supreme Court cases establishing that "a State may not invidiously 
12 Id. at 1225, 358 N.E.2d at 253. 
13 ld. 
" Id. at 1223-24, 358 N.E.2d at 253. 
•• Id. at 1229, 358 N.E.2d at 255. 
§3.9. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2504, 356 N.E.2d 702. 
z See Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Mishou, 321 Mass. 615, 635, 75 N.E.2d 3, 15 (1947); Kent 
v. Barker, 68 Mass. [2 Gray] 535, 536-38 (1854). 
3 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2504, 256 N.E.2d at 702. 
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discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial 
benefits accorded children generally."4 
The Court somewhat summarily rejected the plaintiff's contention 
that section 20 denied her equal protection of the law, reasoning that 
the decisions relied on by the plaintiff " ... have no application to the 
interpretation of a will and the legal effect of words used."5 Moreover, 
the Court stated that: 
The statute here under attack forbids nothing and compels noth-
ing; it merely provides a framework within which private testa-
mentary decisions may be freely made. There would be nothing 
invidious in a legislative judgment that omission of a legitimate 
child from a will is an indication of possible mistake but that 
omission of an illegitimate child is not. 8 
In addition, the Court found that even if section 20 were constitution-
ally required to be applied to the plaintiff, she would not be entitled to 
inherit because of the effect of section 5 of chapter 190.7 Under section 
5, an illegitimate child inherits from her mother but not from her father. 
Thus, if section 20 were made applicable to the plaintiff so that she 
would have taken as if her father had died intestate, the plaintiff would 
have come away empty-handed. 
Both grounds for the Court holding appear problematic. The second 
reason advanced by the Hanson Court has been rendered unpersuasive, 
at least as to future cases, by a subsequent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court. Shortly after Hanson was decided, the Supreme Court, 
in Trimble v. Gordon, 8 struck down as violative of the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment an Illinois law permitting illegiti-
mate children to inherit only from their mothers. The Illinois provision 
was almost identical to section 5 of chapter 190 of the General Laws. 
Thus, the validity and precedential value of the second ground of the 
Hanson opinion seem doubtful at best in the wake of Trimble. 
Moreover, the Court's reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs equal pro-
tection contentions appear less than convincing. For instance, the 
Court's implication to the contrary notwithstanding, the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment would not seem to apply only 
where a state statute "forbids" or "compels" activity of a particular 
kind. Thus, it is unclear why the mere fact that Hanson involved the 
' Id. at 2506, 356 N.E.2d at 703. 
• Id. at 2507, 356 N.E.2d at 703. 
I Id. 
7 G.L. c. 190, § 5 provides: "An illegitimate child shall be heir of his mother and of any 
maternal ancestor, and the lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such 
person and take by descent any estate which such person would have taken if living." 
• 430 u.s. 762, 776 (1977). 
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interpretation and legal effect of a will exempted the Jlaintiff from the 
protections of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, it would appear 
that "a legislative judgment that omission of a legiti ate child from a 
will is an indication of possible mistake but that omiss on of an illegiti-
mate child is not," could be viewed as establishing an i vidious distinc-
tion, despite the Court's declaration to the contrary. In eed, in Trimble, 
the Supreme Court appeared to cast considerable do bt upon legisla-
tive presumptions of intent where the group disadvan aged as a result 
of the presumption "has been a frequent target of di crimination, as 
illegitimates have .... "1 Particularly, the Court ind cated that with 
respect to presumptions of intent in such circumstance , "we doubt that 
a state constitutionally may place the burden on [the disadvantaged] 
group by invoking the theory of 'presumed intent.' " 10 
§3.10. Lost Will. Some attorneys follow the practic of having a will 
executed in duplicate. The reason for this procedure is to assure the 
existence of a duplicate original copy of the will for pro ate in the event 
that at the death of the testator the executed original annot be found. 
The execution of a single instrument, however, does not prevent an 
unexecuted carbon copy from being probated if the o iginal is lost.• 
Under Massachusetts law "when a will once known t exist cannot be 
found after the death of the testator, there is a presum tion that it was 
destroyed by the maker with an intent to revoke it.''2 uch a presump-
tion may, however, be rebutted by competent evidence to the contrary. 
In Lombard v. Zola3 the Appeals Court sustained th decision of the 
probate court in approving and allowing a tissue exec ted copy of the 
decedent's will when the original copy could not be fo nd. The propo-
nent, the decedent's daughter, testified, and the cou held that her 
testimony warranted an inference that the will had not een destroyed.~ 
§3.11. Trusts-Allowability of Charges of Atto ey-Trustee. In 
Lembo v. Casaly1 the Appeals Court reversed a proba e court decision 
surcharging the defendant, an attorney who was servin as sole trustee 
' ld. at 775 n.16. _ L 
11 ld. For a further discussion of Hanson, see Ortwein, Constitutio"fl Law, infra § 10.6, 
at 215-20. i 
. I 
§3.10. 1 Gannon v. MacDonald, 361 Mass. 851, 279 N.E. 2d 668 ~1972). 
• Smith v. Smith, 244 MaBB. 320, 321, 138 N.E. 539 (1923). I 
1 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 224, 359 N.E. 2d 1324. 1 
4 In Olsson v. Waite, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 144, 359 N .. 2d 656, the court 
reached an opposite result in sustaining the trial judge's finding that he original will had 
been destroyed with the intention of revoking it, and thus disallowe a signed copy for 
probate. 
§3.11. 1 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 422, 361 N.E.2d 1314. 
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of a living trust he created for the plaintiffs decedent, the settlor and 
original plaintiff in the action.2 
In 1964 the settlor owned substantial real estate, all of the capital 
stock of Holliston Realty Co., Inc. (Holliston) and Pinecrest Country 
Club, Inc. (Pinecrest).3 Holliston owned substantial real estate, and 
Pinecrest owned and operated a 13-hole golf course! The settlor was in 
poor health and in financial difficulty. A mortgage on some of the real 
estate was in default and foreclosure proceedings had been commenced. 
In an attempt to extricate himself from his financial difficulties, the 
settlor retained the services of the defendant to assist him in the manag-
ing of his business affairs.5 At the settlor's suggestion the defendant 
created a trust under which the defendant was to serve as sole trustee 
and to be the sole beneficiary. 8 The trust was to continue for a period of 
ten years, following which its assets were to be sold and distribution 
made to the settlor. During the term of the trust the net income was to 
be distributed to the settlor at reasonable times. Following the creation 
of the trust the settlor transferred his real estate holdings together with 
his Holliston and Pinecrest stock to the trust. 7 
Under the trust instrument the defendant was authorized to carry on 
any business operations he might deem necessary. He was also author-
ized to borrow money on behalf of the trust and pledge or mortgage trust 
assets to secure the payment of loans made to the trust. 8 The trust 
instrument also specifically authorized the defendant "to fix reasonable 
compensation for his own services to the [t]rust ... [and] to repre-
sent the [ t ]rust . . . in legal proceedings relating to the property of the 
[ t ]rust."' 
The defendant was able to obtain a bank loan in the sum of 
$150,000.00 ·on the conditions that the loan be secured by a mortgage 
on the bulk of the trust properties and that the note be executed by him 
individually as well as in his capacity as trustee. 10 The settlor agreed 
that the defendant would be entitled to reasonable compensation for his 
services in arranging the refinancing, creating the trust and serving as 
trustee. 11 
The probate court judge disallowed as a matter of law several items 
• Id. at 423, 361 N.E.2d at 1316. 
• ld. at 424, 361 N.E.2d at 1316 . 
• ld. 
0 /d. 
• Id. at 425, 361 N.E.2d at 1316. 
7 /d. at 426, 361 N.E.2d at 1317. 
• I d. at 425, 361 N .E.2d at 1316 . 
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of compensation to which the plaintiff objected. 12 The first item chal-
lenged by the .plaintiff related to the defendant's fee paid from the 
proceeds of the bank loan. In the transaction in question the defendant 
acted for the bank in examining the title to the morlaged real estate 
and in preparing closing documents. The master had determined that 
the defendant did not "specifically" advise the plai tiff that he was 
acting for the bank. The probate court upheld the pl intiffs objection 
to this payment on the ground that "profits intentional y derived by the 
... [defendant] from a nondisclosed conflict of interest are impermis-
sible as a matter of public policy and law. " 13 The Appeals Court reversed 
and found that the services rendered by the defendant were necessary 
and proper to effectuate the closing of the bank loan, payment of which 
he personally guaranteed.•• Furthermore, there was no evidence that the 
defendant concealed his representation of the bank 15 Therefore the 
court held that there was nothing improper-absent contrary provi-
sion in the trust-in allowing extra compensation to a t ustee who is also 
an attorney for his performance of legal services in be alf of a trust.•• 
The probate court had also disallowed charges made y the defendant 
to the trust for (a) his legal services rendered in defen ing suits against 
Holliston and Pinecrest; (b) his services in managing the business affairs 
of Pinecrest as an officer and director; and (c) the services of his office 
employees who had performed routine fiscal affairs of Pinecrest. 17 The 
basic ground for the disallowance was that these charges should have 
been made to and paid by the corporations. In revers'ng this finding, 
the Appeals Court stressed that the plaintiff was the so e income benefi-
ciary of the trust and would be the sole distributee at the termination 
of the trust. 18 Since the purpose of the trust was to bene 1t the plaintiffs 
financial condition without regard to the nature of the ssets held by the 
trustee the court concluded that "the trust's paying the e items resulted 
in nothing more startling than loans by the trust to the corporations, 
loans of a type the defendant was authorized to make under the express 
provisions of the trust."" Since the plaintiff did not suggest that the 
corporations were incapable of repaying these loans the court concluded 
that "the plaintiff . . . failed to show any injury to the trust as a whole 
11 ld. at 426, 361 N.E.2d at 1317. With regard to each of the disallo ed items, however, 
the master had found that the amount of the charge by the defe dant was fair and 
reasonable. 
11 Id. at 427, 361 N.E.2d at 1317. 
I. ld. 
11 ld. at 428, 361 N.E.2d at 1317. 
11 ld. at 427-28, 361 N.E.2d at 1317. 
17 I d. at 430, 361 N .E.2d at 1318. 
II Jd. 
11 Id. at 431, 361 N.E.2d at 1319. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/6
§3.12 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 53 
or himself in particular. "20 Thus the court found that the probate court 
was wrong in surcharging the defendant for these items. 21 
§3.12. Omnibus Probate Bill. Chapter 515 of the Acts of 1976, the 
so-called "Omnibus Probate Bill" ("bill"), became effective January 1, 
1978.1 The bill makes numerous changes in the probate law, practice 
and procedure of the Commonwealth. The bill has its source in the 
Uniform Probate Code ("Code").2 However, the legislature declined to 
adopt the Code in its entirety. Instead, the approach of the legislature 
was to adopt those provisions of the Code considered to constitute im-
provements over prior Massachusetts law. 3 Among the interests the bill 
seeks to further are "simplicity, clarity, uniformity with other jurisdic-
tions, speeding up the probate process and the settlement of estates, 
reducing probate expense, avoiding unnecessary complications, bring-
ing the laws of intestacy and construction of wills into line with the 
expectations of most citizens, and avoidance of traps for the unwary. "• 
Some of the bill's changes relate to substantive rights in decedent's 
estates, others to the manner in which wills may be made and estates 
administered. In addition to these substantive and procedural changes, 
new canons of construction have also been added. This chapter will not 
discuss all of the bill's provisions, but rather will focus upon several 
provisions of particular importance. In light of the scope and importance 
of the changes effected by the bill, the practitioner is encouraged to read 
the bill in its entirety. 
One of the bill's most important changes relates to the share of a 
surviving spouse of an intestate decedent. Section 2 of chapter 515 
amends section 1 of chapter 190 to provide that when an individual dies 
intestate leaving both a surviving spouse and issue, the surviving spouse 
will take one-half of the real and one-half of the personal property in the 
estate. Formerly, a surviving spouse would have been entitled to a one-
third share when the decedent left issue. 
Certain of the bill's provisions relate to the manner in which wills 
shall be executed. Section 3 amends section 1 of chapter 191 to provide 
that wills executed after January 1, 1978 will require two competent 
witnesses. Prior to the enactment of this change, three witnesses were 
required. In addition and in accordance with this change, section 5 of 
the bill amends section 2 of chapter 191 to provide that a devise or legacy 
28 Jd. 
21 ld. 
§3.12. 1 Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 35, as amended by Acts of 1977, c. 76. 
2 For a good discussion of the bill's background, see generally Young, Probate Change, 
20 BosTON BAR J. 6, 6-8 (December 1976) [hereinafter cited as Young]. 
s Jd. at 7. 
'Id. at 6. 
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to a subscribing witness or to a husband or wife of a subscribing witness 
will be void unless there are two other subscribing witnesses who are not 
benefited under the will. 
Section 45 of the bill adds a new section 1A to c. 191 hich sets forth 
rules of construction which will be applicable to wills exe uted or repub-
lished on or after January 1, 1978. Section 1A provides hat a will shall 
be construed under the law of the Commonwealth or a other jurisdic-
tion specified by the testator unless the application of t at law is con-
trary to the public policy of Massachusetts.• Under this new section, a 
testator may presumably choose the law which will govern the construc-
tion of his will. 
Section 1A, in addition, changes the law with respect to bequests of 
securities.7 Under its terms, a legatee who receives a bequest of securi-
ties will be entitled to as much of the bequeathed securi~·es as are a part 
of the testator's estate. The legatee will also be entitle to other addi-
tional securities of the same issuer owned by the testat r as a result of 
an action initiated by the issuer, 8 and securities of other ssuers received 
by the testator in exchange for the bequeathed securiti~s as a result of 
a merger, consoldiation, reorganization, or other similat action. These 
entitlements exist, however, only to the extent that a contrary intent is 
not indicated by the will. • The most significant aspect of the securities 
provisions of section 1A is their recognition of a legatee's entitlement to 
securities accruing to the estate as a result of stock splits. In this respect 
section 1A is a codification of a recent opinion of the Supreme Judicial 
Court•• in which the Court overruled its earlier approach to the devis-
ability of securities acquired in stock splits. : 
Prior to 1973, the Court generally viewed the issue a~ turning upon 
whether a devise was intended by the testator to b+ "general" or 
"specific." In particular, when a devise was determined tp be "general," 
the executor or administrator of the estate would be required, if the 
1 Subsequent to the Survey year, the legislature amended Acts of 1976, c. 5.5, § 4 by 
deleting clause 1 of G.L. 191, f 1A, which provided: 
A legatee or devisee who fails to survive a testator by one hund~d and twenty 
hours shall be deemed to have predeceased the testator unless he will of the 
decedent otherwise provides by express reference to survivorship or with respect to 
simultaneous deaths or common disaster, or by other like provisi n. 
Acts of 1977, c. 637, § 1. This subsequent amendment did not alter t e other clauses of 
G.L. c. 191, § 1A, except insofar as it required their renumbering. , 
1 G.L. c. 191, § 1A, cl. 1, added by Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 4, as arkended by Acts of 
1977, c.637, § !.Formerly, the only references in G.L. c. 191 to "choice bf law" were those 
of§ 5, which provides that wills executed in accordance with either the law of the testator's 
domicile or the law of the place where executed, shall be deemed valid. 
7 Id., cl. 3. 
• Specifically excluded are securities acquired by exercise of purchase options. ld. 
• G.L. c. 191, § 1A, cl. 2. 
" Bostwick v. Hurstel, 364 Mass. 282, 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973). 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/6
§3.12 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 55 
shares described in the will were not in the testator's possession at the 
time of his death, either to purchase the described number of shares or 
to turn over an equivalent amount in cash. 11 A general devise, however, 
would not entitle the legatee to receive additional shares issued to stock-
holders as a result of a stock split which occurred prior to the testator's 
death. In the case of a "specific" devise, the result was, in effect, the 
reverse. Thus, if the bequest were deemed specific, the legatee would 
receive nothing unless the described securities were, in fact, owned by 
the testator at his death. However, unlike the general legatee, a specific 
legatee would be entitled to receive shares resulting from a stock split. 12 
The Supreme Judicial Court has expressly rejected the general vs. 
specific test in dealing with stock splits. In Bostwick v. Hurstel 13 the 
Court held that in the absence of an indication of a contrary intent, a 
legatee of a bequest of stock is entitled to shares of stock received as a 
result of a stock split occurring between the time of the execution of the 
will and the testator's death. 14 The decision was based upon the ration-
ale that a stock split is declared by the corporation and the testator has 
no control over his receipt of such shares. 15 Section lA, which recognizes 
the legatee's entitlement to securities owned by the testator or his estate 
"by reason of action initiated by the issuer" clearly incorporates the 
holding and reasoning of Bostwick. 18 
Section lA also modifies existing Massachusetts law by providing 
that a general residuary clause will not exercise a power of appointment 
created by another instrument unless there is a reference to the power, 
or an indication of the testator's intention to exercise the powerY Pre-
viously, it had been held in Massachusetts that a residuary clause will 
11 Fall River Nat'l Bank v. Estes, 279 Mass. 380, 384, 181 N.E. 242, 244 (1932). 
It lgoe v. Darby, 343 MaBB. 145, 149, 177 N.E.2d 676, 678 (1961). 
13 364 Mass. 282, 304 N.E.2d 186 (1973). 
14 Id. at 292, 304 N.E.2d at 192. Other jurisdictions have adopted a similar rule. See, 
e.g., Egavian v. Egavian, 102 R.I. 740, 232 A.2d 789 (1967); In Re Harvey Estate, 110 N.H. 
484, 272 A.2d 603 (1970). 
10 Another reason proffered by the Court for the result reached was that a stock split 
does not change the proportionate interest of any stockholder of the corporation. 364 MaBB. 
at 292-95, 304 N.E.2d at 192-3. 
" The Bostwick decision did not consider the question of shares received in exchange 
for the bequeathed shares as a result of a merger or reorganization. However, the provision 
of §1A concerning mergers or reorganizations, see text at notes 8-9 supra, appears to be 
an outgrowth of Bostwick. In particular, since the testator ordinarily has little control over 
his receipt of shares received in a reorganization, the Bostwick rationale would appear to 
apply as well in the case of a reorganization as in the case of a stock split. For a further 
discuBBion of this subject, see generally Annotation: Change in Stock or Corporate Struc-
ture, or Split or Substitution of Stock of Corporation, as Affecting Bequest of Stock, 46 
A.L.R. 3rd 7 (1972). 
17 G.L. c. 191, § 1A, cl. 4, added by Acts of 1976, c. 515 § 4, as amended by Acts of 1977, 
c. 637, § 1. 
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exercise a general power of appointment unless there is an affirmative 
indication of a contrary intent.18 In view of this change, those drafting 
wills for individuals who have been given powers of appointment should 
be careful to ascertain the client's wishes, and to make specific reference 
to the power if there is an intent that it is to be exerpised. 
Finally, section 1A of chapter 19118 provides that -r.here a testator 
makes residuary gifts to two or more persons, and the fhare of one fails 
for any reason, that share will pass proportionately the remaining 
residuary legatees. This provision abrogates the rule reviously recog-
nized in Massachusetts according to which a gift of a share of the residue 
to a person not deemed to be a member of a class would lapse and pass 
as intestate property. The exception to this rule was the legatee who was 
a child or other relation of the testator and left issue surviving, in which 
case the so-called anti-lapse statute would control. 20 ~ 
Section 6 of chapter 515 significantly alters the law s to the effect of 
a testator's divorce upon his or her preexisting will. P ior to the enact-
ment of the bill, the rule in Massachusetts was that dtvorce would not 
operate to revoke or modify a will. 21 This rule has be n abrogated by 
section 6 of the bill, which adds a paragraph to section of chapter 19122 
providing that a divorce or annulment which occurs subsequent to the 
execution of a will, shall operate to revoke any disposition in the will to 
the former spouse, or any appointment of the former spouse as executor, 
guardian, conservator or trustee. Moreover, property devised to the for-
mer spouse shall pass as if the former spouse had failed to survive the 
decedent. 23 f' 
Section 7 of the bill specifies that section 22 of cha ter 191, the so-
called "anti-lapse statute," is applicable to class gifts Section 22 pro-
vides inter alia: ! 
I 
H a devise or legacy is made to a child or other relation of the 
testator, who dies before the testator, but leaves issue surviving the 
" Beals v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., 367 Mass. 318, 325-26, 326 N.E.2d 896, 
900-01 (1975). 
11 G.L. c. 191, § 1A, cl. 5, added by Acts of 1976, c. 515, § 4, as amended by Acts of 
1977, c. 637, §1. : 
,. G.L. c. 191, §22. See Buffington v. Mason, 327 Mass. 195, 97 i.E.2d 538 (1951). 
21 Hertrais v. Moore, 325 Mass. 57, 61, 88 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1949). 
22 G.L. c. 191, § 9 provides inter alia, that "(t]he marriage of a erson shall act as a 
revocation of a will made by him previous to such marriage, unless it appears from the 
will that it was made in contemplation thereof." Acts of 1976, c. 515, §6 does not alter 
the provisions of § 9 as to the effect of marriage upon a will. 
22 G.L. c. 191, § 9, as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §6, also provides that "[ijf 
provisions shall be revoked solely by this section, they shall be revived by the testator's 
remarriage to the former spouse." Section 9 indicates as well that "[a] decree of separa-
tion which does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for the 
purpose of this section." 
24
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testator, such issue shall, unless a different disposition is made or 
required by the will, take the same estate which the person whose 
issue they are would have taken if he had survived the testa-
tor .... 
57 
Section 7 of the bill adds the following sentence to section 22: "[t]his 
section shall apply to a devise or legacy under a class gift whether the 
death occurred before or after the execution of the will."24 Thus, prop-
erty left to a class-such as, for example, "my children in equal 
shares"-will not be divided only among the members of the class sur-
viving at the death of the testator. Rather, the "anti-lapse statute" will 
apply to preserve a predeceased class member's share for his issue. 
Section 7, in applying the "anti-lapse statute" to class gifts, constitutes 
a codification of prior judicial interpretation of the statute.25 
The bill also addresses situations in which property passes subject to 
a security interest. Previously, unless the will specifically provided oth-
erwise, a specific devise of real estate subject to a mortgage was deemed 
to be a devise of only the interest possessed by the testator;21 the real 
estate passed to the devisee subject to the mortgage. The rule was other-
wise with regard to personal property and the legatee of personal prop-
erty subject to a security interest was entitled to the property free of any 
security interest. Section 8 of the bill eliminates this distinction between 
devises of real and personal property, and amends section 23 of chapter 
191 to provide that encumbered property, whether real or personal, will 
pass to the legatee or devisee subject to any security interest given by 
the testator "unless the contrary shall plainly appear by [the] will." 
Moreover, section 23 now provides that the executor or administrator 
who is required to pay any mortgage or obligation of the testator may 
apply to the probate court for leave to sell the asset in order to reimburse 
the estate. 
In addition to amending chapter 191 in the aforementioned respects, 
the bill has also effected changes in chapter 197. Thus, for example, the 
bill21 has added section 25A to chapter 197, providing that property 
given to a pecuniary legatee by a testator subsequent to the execution 
of the will shall be considered, to the extent of the gift, to have been 
given in satisfaction of the legacy only if the will so provides; if the 
testator so declared in a contemporary writing; or if the legatee has so 
acknowledged in writing. 28By this enactment the legislature has overri-
z• Acts of 1976, c. 515, §7. 
zo See In Re Stockbridge [Stockbridge, Petitioner], 145 Mass. 517, 520, 14 N.E. 928, 
929 (1888). 
H G.L. c. 191, § 23. 
Z1 Acts of 1976, c. 515, §21. 
zo § 25A also provides that for purposes of partial satisfaction the property so received 
will be valued as of the date of the gift or as of the date of the death of the testator, 
25
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den the ancient Massachusetts rule that "an advancement of money or 
goods to a child [of the testator], especially on marriape, is presumed 
to be an ademption of a legacy, for like money or gooqs specified in a 
will previously made by the father, on a presumption that it was so 
intended. "21 
Sections 9 through 12 of the bill amend chapter 192 tq simplify proce-
dures relating to the probate of wills. For instance a will may now be 
allowed without testimony if it is self-proved by affidavits of the testator 
and the witnesses, which affidavits are attached to th~lwill at the time 
of execution. 30 Under this procedure, the testator an~ both witnesses 
sign the will and then appear before a notary before whom they are 
sworn and make oath that the will is the testator's free act and deed; 
that the witnesses signed as witnesses; and that to the best of their 
knowledge the testator is over eighteen years of age and of sound mind. 
This procedure thus avoids the difficulty of securing witnesses at the 
time the will is offered for probate. I 
Section 10 of the bill adds four sections to chapter 192r• relating to the 
appointment and powers of temporary executors. The temporary execu-
tor concept was developed to speed up procedure and avoid delays in 
probate.32 Accordingly, section 13 of chapter 192 provi1es inter alia: 
The probate court may, without the necessity of any notice, ap-
point the executor or executors named in a will, if suitable, tempo-
rary executor or executors upon application containe~ in the peti-
tion for probate or made subsequent to the filing thereof, if the 
testator has requested such appointment, or if said application is 
assented to in writing by the widow or husband, ~f any, of the 
deceased, and by all the heirs at law and next of kin o~ the deceased 
of full age and legal capacity. 
Section 13 further provides that where the appointmen~ is made at the 
testator's request without the assent of the described ~eirs and next of 
whichever occurred first. 1 
• Paine v. Parsons, 31 Mass. [14 Pickering] 318, 320 (1833). J! 
• G.L. c. 192, §2, as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §9. The escribed procedure 
applies only where "it appears'to the probate court, by the consent in writing of the heirs, 
or by other satisfactory evidence, that no person interested in the estafte of [thej deceased 
person intends to object to the probate of an instrument purporting t be the will of such 
deceased, ... " ld. Moreover, in the absence of such objecting person , the probate court 
may grant probate of an instrument without testimony if the probate of such instrument 
is assented to in writing by the widow or husband of the deceased, if
1 
any, and by all the 
heirs at law and next of kin. ld. I 
11 G.L. c. 192, §§ 13-16, added by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §10. 
12 The temporary executor concept was envisioned by the legislature as an alternative 
to the more liberal Uniform Probate Code concept of "informal probate." Probate judges 
in the Commonwealth objected to the "informal probate" concept ts inviting abuse of 
trust. See Young, supra note 2, at 3. 
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kin, those heirs and next of kin must be given seven days prior written 
notice of the petitioner's intent to seek the appointment.33 
Under section 14 of chapter 19234 the temporary executor will have 
substantially the powers granted to the executor under the will, which 
powers will cease upon the appointment of the executor. Under section 
16, where the temporary executor and executor are one and the same, 
the executor may account for the period during which he acted as tem-
porary executor in his account as executor. Section 15 concerns the 
termination of the powers of the temporary executor and provides that 
such powers terminate upon approval of the executor or administrator, 
upon decree of the court, or, in any event, within ninety days of the 
appointment of the temporary executor. However, section 15 also pro-
vides that the probate court has discretion to grant one or more exten-
sions of not more than ninety days each. 
The provisions of sections 13, 14, 15 and 16 will be extremely helpful 
in simplifying administration of estates and will be particularly useful 
where the decedent operated a business. Practitioners who are drafting 
wills for such individuals should plan to include a provision requesting 
that the court appoint the executor to serve as temporary executor while 
the appropriate notice is being given relative to the appointment of an 
executor. 
Section 14 of the bill amends section 2 of chapter 197 to provide that 
where an executor has not had notice, within four months after the 
approval of his bond of claims indicating that the estate may be insol-
vent, he may upon the expiration of the four month period, pay debts 
due from the estate. This section is part of a general revision of the 
procedure for presenting claims against a decedent's estate. Since 1972, 
creditors of a decedent's estate have been· subject to a special "short" 
statute of limitations which requires that any action be commenced 
within nine months after the filing of the executor's bond.u Section 9 
of chapter 197 required that the executor or administrator be served in 
hand prior to the expiration of the nine month period, or that a notice 
of the claim and the action be filed with the registry of probate in which 
the decedent's estate was being administered. This requirement became 
troublesome where claims were made and the executor or administrator 
failed to indicate whether or not the claims would be paid. Importantly, 
section 15 of the bill amends section 9 of ~hapter 197 so that a creditor 
may protect himself by mailing or delivering the claim to the personal 
representative and filing the claim with the registry of probate within 
31 This notice provision appears to have been designed to modify the Uniform Probate 
Code's concept of total lack of notice. See Young, supra note 2, at 11. 
14 G.L. c. 192, §14, added by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §10. 
31 G.L. c. 197, §9, as amended by Acts of 1972, c. 256. 
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the first four months after the approval of the executor's or administra-
tor's bond. Alternatively, the claimant may bring suit ag~inst the execu-
tor in any court in which the executor may be subject Jo jurisdiction; 
however, such suit must still be commenced within nine months of the 
date of filing of the executor's or administrator's bond and must be 
served in hand or an appropriate notice filed with the probate court.38 
If an executor receives a claim filed within four montts of his bond, . 
he will have sixty days within which to notify the claima t of the disal-
lowance of the claim. If no action is taken within this pe iod, the claim 
will be deemed allowed.37 If the creditor receives notice of disallowance, 
he may commence an action within sixty days after mailing to him of 
such notice or within nine months after the giving of~the executor's 
bond, whichever is the later date. As in the prior statu e, the probate 
court may extend the time for filing an action agains a decedent's 
estate to a time not more than one year from the date of filing of the 
executor's or administrator's bond. However, application for such an 
extension must be made within the original nine montt period.38 
In accordance with these changes in procedure, secti n 21 has been 
amended to provide that the probate court may require that a legatee 
or next of kin who demands payment of his share prior to the expiration 
of the time for commencement of actions by creditors provide a bond 
to indemnify the executor or administrator against any lo,ses on account 
of such payment. 3' I 
Chapter 515 also amends the General Laws by the addi~ion of chapter 
199A applicable to the authority of foreign fiduciaries to act in the 
Commonwealth. Prior to the enactment of the bill, guardians, conserva-
tors, executors, or administrators appointed under the llws of a foreign 
jurisdiction lacked power to act in Massachusetts, or to ue or be sued, 
except in certain limited instances for the most part se forth by stat-
ute. 40 Under the provisions of chapter 199A, a foreign fiduciary may 
collect debts, and may maintain actions in the Commonwealth41 pro-
vided that no local fiduciary has been appointed, and p~ovided further 
that he files with the probate court authenticated copies pf his appoint-
ment and his official bond.42 Where the conditions set fotth in the stat-
ute are applicable, a creditor who makes payment to a foreign fiduciary 
will also be protected.t3 Generally, chapter 199A should have the impor-
11 ld., as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §15. 
17 ld. 
,. Id. 
11 Jd., § 21, as amended by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §20. 
41 See, e.g., Saporita v. Litner, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2929, 358 N.E.2d 809 (1976). 
•• G.L. c. 199A, §§2, 6, added by Acts of 1976, c. 515, §22. 
•• The proviso is set forth in id., §7 . 
.. ld., §2. 
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tant effect of affording increased protection to Massachusetts creditors, 
debtors and fiduciaries in their transactions with foreign fiduciaries.44 
" See generally Young, supra note 2, at 16-17. 
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